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environmental policy changes. The implications of regional and multilateral trade liberalization 
initiatives and Indonesia’s ongoing unilateral trade reforms will be analysed, along with other potential 
domestic policy changes and significant external shocks such as the entry of China and Taiwan into the 
World Trade Organization. The analysis will draw on and adapt computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models such as the national INDOGEM Model (built as part of an earlier ACIAR project) and the global 
GTAP Model. 
The project is being undertaken in close collaboration with the Indonesian Ministry of 
Agriculture and ministries involved in trade, planning, and the environment. A Research Advisory 
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Introduction 
 
 After the ‘El Nino’ drought in 1997, 1998 will be remembered as 
the ‘krismon’, or the year of dire monetary depreciation in Indonesia. 
However, in Sulawesi, in a free market background, a highly competitive 
marketing chain, and an already booming economy, its cocoa sector is 
experiencing an unexpected and fabulous windfall: the price of cocoa 
increased five fold within a few months. This helped farmers in the hills 
to recoup the losses in yields caused by the drought, and even slightly 
improve their purchasing power. In the plains, where the cocoa trees 
resisted the drought quite well, the windfall enabled farmers to buy 
motorcycles, cars, improve their houses and also to invest in new land. 
The Sulawesi cocoa sector was already booming before the crisis, but 
1998 definitely was the cocoa year. It will accelerate deforestation and 
investments in new plantings and create jobs. Rice farmers and people 
from the rice growing regions will keep coming to cocoa pioneer fronts 
in the highest numbers. However, those who gain the greatest profit from 
the 1998 windfall are the already established cocoa farmers who have all 
required information and experience about cocoa. Very few new 
migrants seem to have come from cities, and none from among 
unemployed people in the cities.   
 With regard to cocoa production, Sulawesi (formerly Celebes) is 
one of the finest historical examples of a cocoa boom. Exports reached 
250,000 tonnes in 1996, from zero 20 years earlier, and the island helped 
Indonesian production to increase from 5,000 to 350,000 tonnes during 
the same period. Those mainly responsible for this fine economic 
success are the Bugis people, well known as traders and travellers 
(Lineton 1975; Pelras 1982, 1996). They migrated from southern 
Sulawesi to the plains and forest-covered mountains in the western, 
central-southern, central and northern parts of the island. Many Balinese 
transmigrants then followed the Bugis steps. 
 With regard to marketing of cocoa within Sulawesi, the Bugis 
trading tradition found a new field of application. They filled the niche 
between grower and exporter, allowing speed and flexibility in the 
funding and establishment of cocoa sectors. The assumption of the 
middleman role by people of the same ethnic group as the growers is no 
doubt one of the reasons for the speed of the boom. The marketing 
sector is extremely effective, as the grower seems to receive between 
80% and 90% of the export FOB price (Ruf 1993: 32-35; Akiyama and 
Nishio 1996: 12-23). Any price change in New York is usually 
transferred to the producer within 24 to 72 hours. This was already the 
case in 1990: when a middleman tried to reduce the price, he was forced 
to come back to the market price the day after, otherwise he would lose 
his market share. This was even more true in 1997, the transference of 
price changes being closer to 24 hours.  
 Owing to cocoa, Bugis farmers switched from survival at a 
subsistence level to relative wealth, enabling an increasing number of 
families to build nice houses, send their children to school, buy 
motorcycles and parabolas, and last but not least, to afford a pilgrimage 
to Mecca. Some Balinese transmigrants also achieved spectacular cocoa 
success stories, symbolised by wonderful Balinese temples in every 
backyard.  Some have even flown back twice to Bali to show off their 
success.  
 All these changes had already occurred before the monetary 
crisis. No other country has ever achieved such rapid development, 
neither in terms of tonnage nor, more importantly, in terms of the 
revenues and enrichment of farmers.  
 The local historical factors of the DI/TII uprising in the 1950s and 
the 1960s greatly favoured the triggering of the cocoa boom in the 1970s 
and 1980s, by bringing information about cocoa and planting material to 
Sulawesi. Two plantations were created on the western coast around 
Pasangkayu in 1958, and those plantations have played a key role in 
providing planting material. Then the DI/TII operations, with its base 
camps in remote forests, also played a role by showing its members 
where forest land was available. Many of them remembered those places 
and migrated there later to plant cocoa. (Ruf, Ehret and Yoddang 1996).  
 Access to land and price factors played a major role in this boom. 
As long as land is available, price increases always lead to a strong 
supply response, mostly by new families entering the cocoa sector 
through an acceleration of migration. This has already been shown in 
Ghana in the 1950s (Hill 1956, 1954), and proven again in a number of 
countries, including Indonesia (Ruf and Ehret 1993). The copying effect 
enhances the whole story (Pomp and Burger 1995). So with the price of 
cocoa in rupiah rocketing in 1998 due to the dire monetary depreciation, 
we may also expect a spectacular supply response in the years to come.  
 Is that the case? Is the 1998 price surge confirmed? Before the 
1998 monetary crisis, most farmers had to endure a severe drought 
which took its toll on yields and tree stock. To what extent was this felt 
in terms of revenues in 1998? How have the 1997 ecological and 1998 
monetary crises interfered with the cocoa farmers’ dynamic? In 
Sulawesi, most cocoa farmers are still relatively young migrants who 
own young cocoa orchards with spectacularly high yields and who 
benefit from an ‘almost perfect free market’ (Ruf and Yoddang 1996, 
1997). How have these ‘crises’ and price surges influenced some 
preliminary signs of very local recessions, and the much stronger, and 
more visible signs of dynamic Bugis and Balinese entrepreneurship?  
 With regard to the methodology and presentation, we attempt to 
show the dynamic of Sulawesi cocoa through case-study examples, and 
small samples of farms followed over time. To appreciate the dynamic 
before the ‘crisis’ and the changes in Sulawesi related to that crisis, 
which is not yet over, the best tool seems to be a follow-up of a few 
farms, rather than large samples and econometric analysis based on 
second hand data. However, the presentation is also based on time series 
and clear charts. The analysis ends at December 1998.  
 
A spectacular windfall from a farmer’s point of view 
 A case-study of a household is an excellent tool to introduce and 
understand a farming system and its dynamics over the years. Both 
before and during the monetary crisis, this is what we do here. We take 
an example from Noling, one of the first villages and regions to adopt 
cocoa. This began at the end of the 1970s, and developed through the 
1980s.  
 
A glimpse of a cocoa farm and its management of trees, labour and 
capital  
 Ahmad’s farm is around 3.25 ha, which is slightly above the 
average. Most households in South Sulawesi own between 2 and 3 
hectares of cocoa. Taking into account the high yields per hectare, 3.25 
ha is already too much to be cared for by the owner and his wife. As the 
children are sent to school, there is a need to hire workers.  
 Such hiring is mostly done under the ‘bagi hasil’ contract, which 
is a type of share cropping. Three fourths of the cocoa output goes to the 
owner, one fourth to the worker, and fertiliser and pesticide costs are 
covered by the owner. 
 ‘Bagi hasil’ is the most frequently used labour contract in 
Sulawesi cocoa farming, especially since 1996/97. Around one third of 
workers are Bugis, and two thirds are Balinese who come from 
transmigration schemes (often transmigrants’ sons and relatives). With 
the price increase, most Balinese workers paid per month clearly 
understood that it would be advantageous to switch to bagi hasil 
contracts, and they managed to impose that change on their employers 
(the owners). They were right to do so. When the price of cocoa 
rocketed in 1998, they also gained a share in the windfall.  
 
 
Table 1.  Description of the cocoa farm plots of Ahmad’s household (cocoa farm 
in South Sulawesi) 
 Ha Date of
planting 
Site location Who manages that cocoa 
farm  
 1993               1995         
1998 
Plot 1 1 1982 plain (Buntu Batu) owner 
 
owner owner 
Plot 2 0.75  1983 plain (Noling) Bagi hasil 
 
GADAI NEW 
GADAI 
Plot 3 1 1985 foothills (Noling) 
ex army base camp
Bagi hasil Bagi hasil Bagi 
hasil 
Plot 4 0.5 1986 foothills (Noling) 
ex army  base
camp 
owner Bagi hasil Bagi 
hasil 
Total 3.25      
Sources: data collected by authors, CIRAD/ASKINDO. 
 
 
 If there is a lack of labour, and a need for fresh capital, an 
alternative is ‘gadai’ or ‘pledging’. The pledge is made for one to three 
years and the return of the plantation is then accompanied by loan 
repayment. Some 5% to 25% of cocoa farmers have, at least once, 
pledged a cocoa plot or a rice field to obtain credit.  
 Of course, the amount of cash involved in the gadai transaction 
depends on the estimated yield of the farm plot and on the current cocoa 
price. In 1992, when the price of cocoa was at its lowest, around 1,300 
rupiah per kilogram, the amount was between 1 and 2.5 million rupiah, 
with a pledge of 0.25-1.25 hectares of cocoa trees for a minimum period 
of 1-2 years and longer if the borrower was unable to repay the loan 
(Ruf and Jamaluddin 1995: 359).  
 In 1995, with a price of around 2,500 rupiah per kilogram, and for 
a high yielding 0.75 ha plot in the plains, the amount borrowable was 7 
million rupiah for three years. The lender and the borrower. could also 
attempt to anticipate prices. If the cocoa price increases just after the 
transaction, the lender is the winner and the borrower is the loser. If the 
price suddenly increases just before the end of the contract, and if the 
owner pledged only a part of his farm, it becomes easy for him to repay 
the loan. This is what happened to Ahmad in February 1998. He took the 
opportunity of the sudden price increase (to some 10 000 Rp/kg) to tie 
the farm to a new lender for an amount of 13 million rupiah for another 
three years, and to refund the former with his 7 million.  
 The amount paid in 1998 was only twice that of 1995 and did not 
fully follow the cocoa price, which quadrupled. The owner was in a 
hurry to negotiate a new pledging in order to seize the opportunity of the 
booming price and to refund the former lender. The new lender may 
have also anticipated a price decline, knowing that the 1998 bonanza 
was not going to last for ever. Anyway, between the refunding of 7 
million and the new gadai of 13 million, this transaction enabled the 
owner to get a net profit of 6 million rupiah in 1998. 
 
Table 2 Relationship between cocoa prices and cocoa farm pledging in the plains. 
Ahmad’s case,  Noling, South Sulawesi. 
 
 1992 1995 February 
1998 
ratio  
1998:95  
Price of cocoa (Rp/kg) 
 
1 300 2 500 10 000 4 
‘Gadai’ (pledging) of a 
cocoa farm in the plains. 
Average amount  (Rp/ ha/ 
year) 
1 000 000  2 300 000 4 300 000 1.8 
Source: data collected by authors, CIRAD/ASKINDO. 
 
 
The 1998 cocoa windfall : the net income tripled in nominal terms 
 The use of cocoa trees as collateral is one way to get credit and to 
cash in on the cocoa windfall. However, it is certainly  not the best way. 
By keeping other farm plots under full control, as most cocoa owners 
do, Ahmad benefited enormously from the windfall (Table 3). 
 Owing to the free cocoa market in Sulawesi and to the free 
exchange rate of the currency, the price in rupiah followed the 
international price in dollars, and exploded in rupiah in 1998. This 
helped to maintain the net output, expressed in US dollars, and to triple 
it in rupiah.  “Net output” here means that only the fertiliser and 
pesticide costs are withdrawn from the output. The labour costs are not 
taken into account. However, as ‘bagi hasil’ workers are paid 20% of the 
output, and if the depreciation costs of the plantation investment are 
excluded, it can be estimated that the net profit Ahmad is around 80% of 
the net output; If herbicides are used, as they mostly are, to save labour, 
costs are paid by the ‘bagi hasil’ worker). Over the last five years, the 
net cocoa output has remained remarkably stable, at a level close to US 
$5500 per year, and thus the net profit is around $4000 to $4500, which 
means a spectacular bonanza of 55 million  rupiah in 1998. 
 
Table 3. Follow-up of input and output of Ahmad’s farm from 1993 to 1998 
 
year price 
(Rp/kg) 
Cocoa  
output 
(kg)  
Cocoa 
output 
(Rp) 
Fertiliser 
expenses 
(Rp)  
Pesticide
s 
expenses
(Rp) 
Net output 
(Rp) 
Exchange  
Net output rate  
(Rp/$)           ($) 
‘93 1 484 5 044 7 484 655    630 000   50 000  6 804
655 
2096 3 246 
‘94 2 140 6 046 12 938 
425 
1 190 000 100 000 11 639
425 
2176 5 349 
‘95 2 292 5 771 13 228 
653 
  978 000 100 000 12 150
653 
2258 5 381 
‘96 2 601 6 873 17 875 
600 
1 200 000 125 000 16 550
600 
2350 7 043 
‘97 3 458 5 421 18 746 
090 
1 426 000 150 000 17 170
090 
2900 5 921 
‘98 12 669 4 610 58 403 
475 
2 500 000 250 000 55 653
475 
10416 5 343 
Source: data collected by authors, CIRAD/ASKINDO. 
 These astonishing results were achieved despite a drop of 25% in 
yields in 1998, as compared with the average of previous years. This 
drop is due to the El Nino related drought in 1997. 
 
 
The 1997 drought and the differences between plains and hills 
 
 In terms of rainfall and yields, 1996 was an excellent year. In 
1997 only the second harvest at the end of the year was affected by the 
drought. A ‘normal yield’ for a ‘normal year’ is something between the 
1996 and 1997 yields and the impact of the drought in 1998 must be 
compared with that average. On the whole farm, the decline was around 
25%.  
 However, this 25% decline was the result of two very different 
impacts of the drought, one in the plains and one in the hills. In the rich 
alluvial plains, the decline in yields was often limited to a mere 5 to 
15%. In fields close to river with humid soils and easy irrigation, some 
yields were even higher. The impact was more severe in the hills, with a 
drop in yields around 35 to 40% (Table 4). 
  
Table 4: Average yields and impact of the 1997 drought in the plains and 
foothills (Ahmad’s farm) 
 
Years Plot 1 in the 
plains  (1 
ha)(kg/ha) 
Plots 3-4 in 
foothills  
(1.5 ha) (kg/ha) 
Average of all 
plots 
(kg/ha) 
1996 3138 2490 2749 
1997 2876 1696 2168 
1998 2664 1297 1844 
Source: Weekly follow-up of farms, by  Ruf, Yoddang and Raïs, 1996-1998.  
 
 A 20% decline in yields is representative of villages, such as 
Noling, set in alluvial plains, where farmers own farms in the plains and 
on the surrounding foothills. The decline may reach 35% to 50% in 
villages in the hills, where most farmers only own plantations on tight 
slopes and in micro-regions which have been deforested for several 
years.1 In regions where deforestation has hardly begun, like in Central 
Sulawesi, the impact of El Nino was relatively low. New migrants still 
benefited from the forest atmosphere and from the forest ‘rent’.  
 In terms of incomes, owing to the 1998 boom price in current 
rupiah, almost all farmers gained something from the balance between 
the drought and the windfall. The change in yields varied from -50% to 
+ 5% but usually was more than offset by the 300% to 500% increase in 
prices in 1998 as compared with 1996/1997.  
 Had the drought not been followed by rocketing prices, the 
Sulawesi cocoa boom would have experienced some migrations of 
established cocoa farmers. They  would have tried to escape the negative 
impact of the drought by looking for new forests, and attempted to profit 
from the forest ‘rent’. However, many farmers would have faced 
recessions. Owing to the ‘crisis’, they did not. The dire monetary 
depreciation was a really important positive factor which enabled 
farmers to keep faith in cocoa and which encouraged the whole 
dynamic. 
 
A brief look at the use or non-use of the extra incomes 
 Compared with the 18 million rupiah gained in 1997, Ahmad 
gained 58 million rupiah. This makes an extra 40 million plus the 6 
million he earned by reallocating the pledged plot to a new lender. How 
did he use the 46 extra million rupiah?  
                                                 
1  In rare cases, some farmers in the hills also managed to buy or hire water pumps and 
irrigate some of the farm plots not too far from mountain rivers.  
 He redistributed an additional 3.5 million to his ‘bagi hasil’ 
workers which shows that the windfall also benefited the workers to 
some extent; many of them were able to buy motorcycles in 1998.  
 He improved his house with some 5 million rupiah. He increased 
the scholarship budget for his sons to 7 million rupiah. He bought a 
motor sprayer for Rp 600,000. Above all, he intended to buy land and 
had left a 30 million rupiah deposit  at what he believed to be a new 
form of local cooperative bank, called KOSPIN (Koperasi Simpan 
Pinjam), offering very high interest rates. This turned out to be a 
swindle, and he lost the 30 million KOSPIN was banned and closed 
down by local authorities by the end of 1998.  
 Although this is a serious loss according to the scale of the South 
Sulawesi province, this case is of course not representative of how 
farmers used or did not use their money. For instance at the level of 
Noling village, some 5% of the farmers might have been cheated that 
way and Ahmad was certainly one the biggest victims.  
 Our interest in this case is not in the cheating itself, but in 
stressing that the windfall was totally unanticipated by farmers. These 
incautious deposits can be interpreted as a form of hasty behaviour 
leading to financial losses. Farmers were unprepared for the opportunity 
to invest that money. In coherence with the Dutch disease theory, which 
says that unexpected windfalls lead to waste, there were some wastes 
and losses. 
 However, the windfall was also widely used to improve the 
standards of living and to invest in agriculture, especially in new land 
(see Section 4).  
 
 
 
The fabulous cocoa windfall from a middleman point of view 
 In 1998, the cocoa windfall clearly benefited farmers and their 
workers. Beyond case study examples, this can also be illustrated at a 
regional level by data recorded with one of three biggest middlemen 
based in Palopo, South Sulawesi. The relationship between the 
increasing production trend explained by new plantings coming into 
production, and the price increase of June-July 1998, generated 
enormous wealth in mid 1998. As the competition between middlemen 
remained intense, the bulk of this wealth went to the cocoa farmers.  
 However, despite competition, this gave the opportunity for the 
middlemen’s profit margins to increase in nominal terms. According to 
the middleman tonnage and his position in the marketing chain, his 
average margin used to vary, before the crisis, between Rp 40 and Rp 
125 per kilogram. In June/July 1998, it varied between Rp 300 and Rp 
600. It also was a spectacular bonanza for middlemen from June to 
September 1998. In the recorded case, the middleman was able to buy 
cars, a truck, land for housing and also fund the construction of a new 
store. More importantly, he added hundreds of million rupiah to his 
available capital, and therefore can expand his commercial activities. It 
was a real windfall.  
 
A real windfall and enrichment of cocoa farmers 
 In mid 1998, almost all cocoa farmers are smiling, and many of 
them provide obvious examples of the excellent rates of “exchange” 
between cocoa and most goods and services.  Rather than using official 
commodity prices, which are general and not necessarily relevant to the 
rural regions, our own records were used. These include price data 
collected in the rural market of Noling also prices quoted by farmers, 
which are often more illuminating than official statements  
 
Motorcycles and cars 
 “With only one big cocoa sale, I got 9.5 million rupiah and I 
immediately bought three motorcycles, one for each of my sons! Last 
year, you needed two tonnes of cocoa for buying one 50 cc bike. Now 
you need less than one tonne” (Noling farmer, July 1998). There is not 
much to add to that farmer’s comment.  
 
Rice 
 Compared with mid 1997, the price of rice was 200% higher at 
the end of 1998. This increase does not deter interest and investment in 
cocoa. In all countries where we studied competition and 
complementarities between food crop systems and cocoa/coffee farms, 
we always found that a cocoa : rice or coffee : rice price ratio, around 
1.5, is sufficient not to deter investment in tree crop farms. Investment is 
only endangered when that price ratio falls below 1.5, which was the 
case in Madagascar coffee regions (Blanc-Pamard and Ruf 1992: 229).  
 This was confirmed by recent adopters of cocoa in Sulawesi in 
1990, when the price had slumped as compared with 1987. Many 
answered that they would continue to plant and maintain cocoa as long 
as the selling price of cocoa was above the purchase price of rice. The 
main reason was return for labour ratio. Rice needs to be planted every 
year or twice a year, while cocoa only once “for ever”, or at most every 
20 to 25 years.   
 It can be seen here that the comparative price of cocoa and rice is 
always above 2, even at its lowest point in 1992. In 1987 and 1988, and 
again since 1995, it is around or above 3, which is extremely 
stimulating. In mid 1998, it peaked at 8, but fell in late 1998. However, 
it has returned to a level of around 3, this remains a price ratio extremely 
favourable to new cocoa investments, namely new plantings.  
 
Fertilisers 
 Up to the mid 1980s, the price of fertilisers increased, but much 
less rapidly than the price of cocoa. In mid July, at the peak of the 
monetary crisis, urea and TSP prices increased by only 10 to 20%.  
However, in November-December 1998, the final removal of 
government subsidies, plus the shortage of fertiliser  (probably due to 
the exhaustion of imported stocks or to the temptation of re-exporting 
them) made this input suddenly much more expensive. In December 
1998, prices of all basic N (nitrogen), P (phosphate) and K(potassium) 
fertilisers were higher by 100% to 200% as compared with mid 1997. 
The comparative price of cocoa to urea came back to its 1989 level. 
Buying one bag of TSP and KCl in December 1998 required two and 
three times more cocoa respectively than 10 years earlier. This is one of 
the rare products whose price increased more than the price of cocoa. 
This happened recently, in December 1998.  
 
 
Labour costs and participation of some workers in the windfall 
 
Contracts on a daily basis 
 In 1989, smallholders needed to sell around 1.7 kg of cocoa to 
cover the cost of one day of hired labour, (including one or two meals, 
coffee and cigarettes). In late 1993, as the price of cocoa recovered,  the 
ratio started decreasing. In July 1998, due to the spectacular price 
increase, to 18,000 rupiah per kilogram, the ratio fell to an all time low, 
around 0.5 kg. However, this triggered demands for increased pay from 
workers, who obtained an 80% increase in daily wages. As a result, 
when the international price decreased the ratio returned to 1.3 kg of 
cocoa to cover one day of labour. In short, although almost back to the 
1989 situation, the comparative price of cocoa to labour is still more 
favourable than in the early 1990s. This should encourage farmers to 
hire daily workers and to invest in new cocoa plantings.  
 Meanwhile, an 80% increase in labour wages also shows that 
there is a shortage of available labour. Those who are prepared to sell 
their labour for a few days are in a strong position. At first sight, the 
increase to 80% seems modest compared with the increase of 100 to 
200% for rice and fertilisers. In coherence with the basic theory, non 
tradeable inputs or ‘less-tradeable’ inputs such as labour seem to 
increase less rapidly than tradeable ones.  However those who are 
willing to be hired as daily workers are either neighbours’ sons and 
daughters, and Balinese workers working as monthly workers and share-
croppers. The latter tell another story about trends in labour costs. 
 
Share-cropping contracts 
By definition, if sharing rates are maintained, share-cropping contracts 
are neutral with regard to unexpected and sudden price changes. 
According to share-cropping theories, this protection against risks is 
precisely one of the reasons behind share cropping arrangements. Even 
if the proportion gained by the share cropper seems low (between one 
sixth and one fourth) if the price of cocoa increases by 400%, and as 
fertilisers and pesticides have to be bought by the owner, the revenue 
also increases by close to 400%.  
 In addition, Balinese who used to accept wages on a monthly 
basis switched en masse to ‘bagi hasil’ contracts one year before. This 
clever change means that their wages increased enormously increases in 
1997 as compared with 1996 and again in 1998 as compared with 1997.  
 
Partial Conclusion 
 Although the peak was reached in mid 1998, levels will probably 
never be that high again. However the price of cocoa,  comparative to all 
factors of production and goods, remains more favourable than ever 
before, at least in December 1998. To some extent, workers also 
benefited, yet they did not hamper the smallholders’ success story.  
 
How was the windfall used ? 
 
Motorcycles and cars 
 In Palopo city, 40 km from Noling, there was a waiting list for 
motorcycles, either new or second hand. One of the most spectacular 
and visible impact of the “monetary crisis” was the purchase of cars, and 
more rarely, trucks and buses. Cocoa farmers were suddenly in a 
position to buy new cars for less than $5000. The actual percentage of 
farmers that bought cars in 1998 is quite low, no more than 3 to 5% even 
in well established cocoa villages no more than 3 to 5% of farmers 
bought cars in 1998. However, in a village of 400 families, this meant a 
sudden additional arrival of 12 to 20 cars; This changed the atmosphere 
of the village considerably.  
 
Savings, losses and waste 
 The case of pseudo cooperatives like ‘KOSPIN’ and thefts of 
money show that many farmers did not know how to save all of that 
sudden wealth. In July 1999, they came to middlemen’s shops with bags 
of cocoa and left again with, almost literally, bags of bank notes. Small 
wonder they were unsure how to handle their new found wealth. This 
was one of the reasons they bought cars or curious items such as 
washing machines, or freezers, although there was not always electricity 
in their houses. They were aware of the fragility of the windfall and of 
the need to buy something before the expected drop in the price of 
cocoa.  They also knew that they had to buy things before prices of 
items increased.  
 It was as if there were not enough goods on sale. Some farmers, 
unavoidably, fell victim to criminals and were swindled through deposit 
systems which offered extremely high interest rates. These losses are 
much less visible than car purchases and constitute difficult to obtain 
information.  However, in a village like Noling, such circumstances 
affected something like 5% of cocoa farmers.  
 
 
Agricultural inputs such as fertilisers: relative stability and 
innovations 
 
 In mid 1998, even though the increase in the price of fertilisers 
had not yet occurred, except for KCl, preliminary discussions with 
farmers indicated a possible decline in fertiliser consumption.  Fertiliser 
prices were considered to be increasing and their physical availability 
was becoming uncertain. However, by the end of 1998, survey results 
indicated that fertiliser consumption changed with regard to the type of 
fertilisers but remained relatively high in absolute terms.  
  
This is an opportunity to stress the high degree of fertiliser consumption 
in Sulawesi. In Noling, in 1993/94, a sample of 20 households and 48 
farm plots, showed an average use of 600 kg of NPK per hectare in the 
plains and some 500 kg in hills. \ Ahmad’s case shows that these 
averages can be exceeded. Some farmers use more than 1000 kg of N,P 
and K per hectare. Moreover, after some 15 years of cocoa growing, 
fertiliser traders started to promote ‘Kaptan,’ or lime, as a “new 
fertiliser” which could keep yields quite high in aging cocoa farm plots.  
 Data from 1998 is not available yet, but taking into account the 
enormous and increasing consumption of fertilisers on the farm, a 
possible slight decline in 1998 might not be detrimental and may be 
rather more rational.  
 
Table 5: Average amount of fertilisers applied per hectare in Ahmad’s farms. 
Evolution from ‘93-’97 
 
 NPK kg/ha Lime kg/ha 
1993 676  0 
1994 892 1260 
1995 1000 1600 
1997 1100 580 
Source:  regular follow-up by Ruf, Yoddang and Raïs. 
 
 
Table 6: Changes in fertiliser consumption between 1993 and 1997 in Ahmad’s 
cocoa  
farm., Noling village. 
 Number of 50 kg Fertiliser bags   
Year and 
area 
rUrea 
N(N) 
TSP 
(P) 
KCl 
(K) 
Sub-total 
of NPK 
Lime Expenses 
(Rp) 
Expenses 
(% of output) 
1993  (3.25 
ha) 
24 10 10 44 0 630 000 8.4 
1994  (3.25 
ha) 
40 6 12 58 82 1 190 000 9.3 
1995  (2.5 
ha)* 
38 0 12 50 80 978 000 7.4 
1997  (2.5 
ha) 
33 0 22 55 29 1 426 000 7.6 
Sources : follow-up by Ruf, Yoddang, Raïs and Kassa, CIRAD/ASKINDO.  
* Note : In 1995, one plot of 0.75 ha was used as collateral and put in ‘Gadai’ 
 
 The sudden increase in price of fertilisers at the end of 1998 may 
well favour a more rational use of basic NPK fertilisers, and at the same 
time promote the adoption of lime, which costs 6000 rupiah per bag. 
Lime traders represent it to cocoa smallholders as a an alternative to 
TSP and KCl, which now cost more than 100,000 rupiah per bag. 
However, after 15 years of cocoa cultivation, this increasing adoption of 
lime seems to have come at the right time. A “crisis” is always an 
opportunity for change and innovation.  
 At the end of 1998, the first conclusion must be to stress the wide 
range of farmers’ responses to the fertiliser price increase. This depends 
on the location of the farm, and its condition after the drought . In many 
cases, despite the price increase, farmers knew that they would have to 
increase fertiliser application at the end of the year, in order to save their 
trees after the drought. In the village of Noling, provisional results are 
given in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Changes in fertiliser consumption in 1998, Noling. 
Changes in fertiliser 
consumption in 1998 
compared with 1997 
% of farmers 
Increase 50 
Decrease 25 
No change 21 
Missing data  3 
Total 100 
Source: survey by authors, CIRAD/ASKINDO, Sept. 1998 
 
 The second conclusion must be that, between those who had to 
increase fertiliser consumption to save their trees and those who could 
afford to reduce fertilisation, the average 1998 consumption more or less 
stabilised and was close to that of 1997, around 500 to 600 kilograms of the 
basic NPK fertiliser per hectare. 
 
Some investment in replanting or attempts at replanting  
 Although some farmers were already getting ready for replanting, 
by establishing nurseries in October 1997, a number of failures had to be 
expected. On the other hand other farmers might well not try to replant, 
but might instead look for 'better land' somewhere else (Ruf 1997).  
Rather than re-plantings, many new plantings must be expected in the 
coming years. New plantings seem to have resumed since 1994 and even 
accelerated in 1996. In 1998, as the farm gate price has increased five 
times in a few months, all the factors are in place for encouraging new 
migration and new plantings 
 
The thirst and rush for land and forest 
 If a commodity price increases, and if there is still forest land 
available, migrations will accelerate at the expense of tropical forests. 
As mentioned in the introduction, this was demonstrated in cocoa 
farming in Ghana in the 1950s at an, apparently, low level of technology 
(Hill 1956, 1964). The same thing was demonstrated in Côte d’Ivoire 
under similar conditions and levels of technology and in Sulawesi in the 
1990s, despite a high technological level, spectacularly high yields and 
access to herbicides which helped with the replanting of grassland 
fallows (Ruf 1995, Ruf, Penot and Yoddang 1999). Moreover, once 
‘cocoa fever’ has tempted migrants and boosted their expectations, even 
if the current price decreases, prices anticipated by farmers keep 
increasing in their minds. This may be enough to keep deforestation 
reasonably active. 
 
 
Lack of land necessarily limits impact 
 From a sample of 40 farmers, mostly based in Noling and along 
the main road to Tampumea village in the hills behind Noling, it would 
be difficult to deny increasing price as an influence on the migration and 
planting decision, at least in the 1980s when land was still abundant and 
easy to negotiate.  
 Even when land is abundant, price is not the only factor 
stimulating new plantings. A ‘copying effect’ also plays a role, as 50% 
of farmers do not necessarily know the exact price of cocoa when they 
make the decision to plant (Burger and Pomp, 1995). However, the 
copying effect is a way to estimate and anticipate good revenues from a 
new crop without having precise  information about prices. From the 
success stories of people who planted before them, and from what these 
first adopters can buy (zinc roofs, motorcycles, trips to Mecca), farmers 
know that they can make much more money by planting cocoa than 
maize, or whatever they used to grow before. If the price of cocoa 
increases, the first adopters may buy more luxurious things, and thus the 
copying effect is a direct tool for turning price increases into new 
investments, even though the new investor does not know the exact 
price.  
 In addition, after several years of cocoa farming in Sulawesi, 
information about prices is much more precise than in the early era of 
cocoa adoption.  The first reason for this is that any potential investors 
are already cocoa farmers. The 1998 price hike may thus have a 
tremendous impact in the years to come. Before 1998, the price 
increases since 1994 should also have provided an incentive for farmers 
to plant.  
 This however has not been seen in the case of Noling and 
Tampumea villages, because the land around Noling and the main road 
to Tampumea has already been fully planted since 1990. Expansion of 
the planted areas to the forested hills is, in theory, forbidden, as this is 
State forest land.  However, in practice, enforcement of this by the 
Forestry service is not very effective. Thus there are still new plantings 
in the steep hills behind Tampumea, and forest clearing is being 
resumed in the 1990s, with these new pioneers building houses or 
shelters close to their new planting. Following the usual processes in 
new pioneer fronts, this will lead to creation of a new village in the 
mountains later on. 
 However, taking into account the remoteness of theses mountains 
and the steep slopes, the only people who are prepared to come are poor 
migrants who have no alternatives, and no capital or experience. Those 
who have both, such as the majority of the established cocoa farmers in 
Noling and Tampumea, prefer to look for more accessible and fertile 
land in the plains and foothills in other areas. This accumulated 
experience and capital has a huge impact on forests in new regions and 
pioneer fronts.   
 
A more significant impact on pioneer fronts and deforestation  
 
 Eventually, one of the most visible impacts of the cocoa price 
hike in an already well established cocoa village is not new local forest 
clearings, but instead the organisation of cocoa farmers in groups to hire 
buses and collectively look for forests in remote regions, especially in 
the province of Central Sulawesi.  In a village like Noling, the 
movement to organise groups of farmers and look for land had already 
started in 1995/96 and in 1997, but accelerated in 1998. At least three 
groups of 10 to 30 farmers organised themselves to achieve that 
objective. 
 One of the most current active pioneer fronts in Central Sulawesi 
is the Bungku region. The first major observation is that new plantings 
started to take off in 1992 when the price of cocoa was at its lowest 
point, and this accelerated in 1995 when the price really increased, but 
well before the crisis. In 1998, new plantings even seemed to have 
slowed down a little. However, this is because new migrants have not 
yet had time to arrive in large numbers. They are very likely to come 
and start planting in 1999. The real numbers of new migrants are 
certainly above those that were quickly recorded in September 1998. 
Many more may have come in the last few months of 1998. On the other 
hand, if new migrants did not establish their own plantations and built 
their own houses or provisional shelters, they were difficult to meet, 
identify and so count. 
 In short, although it is still difficult to demonstrate with figures 
collected in 1998, forest clearing, and more importantly forest 
appropriation (with or without monetary transactions) are on an 
exponential rise since the monetary crisis and the price hike. This should 
be easier to demonstrate with data from surveys that will be conducted 
in 1999 and 2000.  Now, if cocoa attracts new migrants, then in 
accordance with its historical role, cocoa cultivation will create new 
jobs. Where do these migrants come from? Does cocoa help to solve 
unemployment in the cities?  
 
Do the monetary crisis and cocoa planting create jobs? 
 The details of migrants’ jobs and origins before coming to 
Bungku confirm the importance of transfers from the rice to the cocoa 
sector (see Table 8).  
 Due to the spectacular incomes obtained in the cocoa sector, to 
the capital accumulated in land, the use of draft animals and new tools in 
rice farming, and also due to the labour freed up by the Green 
Revolution, a major transfer occurred in terms of capital, labour, 
innovations as was the case with fertilisers (Ruf and Yoddang 1996, 
1997). The transfer of labour through migrations from the rice-growing 
regions to cocoa pioneer fronts was started in the early 1990s, and 
continued in 1997 and 1998 (Table 9). 
Table 8: Status and jobs of migrants before they came to Bungku 
 
Status/ job Percentage 
Rice farmer 37 
Rice farmer’s son 13 
Cocoa farmer 13 
Cocoa and rice farmer 8 
Cocoa farmer’s son 3 
Cloth trader, driver 10 
Wood trader 3 
Agricultural worker 3 
Resettled by the army after the control 
of the DI/TII uprising in the 1960s 
5 
Non active, still young 5 
Total 100 
Source: survey by authors, CIRAD/ASKINDO, Sept. 1998.   
 
 
Table 9: Region of origin, and employment sector of migrants before arrival in 
Bungku. Evolution in 1997/1998 
 % of all migrants % among migrants 
arrived in 1997/98 
Rice sector 50 47 
Cocoa sector 24 35 
Other rural sector 16 0 
Services and more 
urban activities 
10 18 
Total 100 100 
Source: survey by authors, CIRAD/ASKINDO, Sept. 1998.   
 
 In 1998, having only conducted preliminary surveys, with small 
samples, in Central Sulawesi, it is still too early to make conclusions on 
such a major issue. However, even small samples seem to confirm what is 
seen in South Sulawesi. The actors who display the most active 
entrepreneurship in new forest clearings and cocoa plantings in 1997 and 
1998 are the already established cocoa farmers. This is logical, as they have 
the most information about cocoa and land, and also have the planting 
material. The most important thing is that their experience in cocoa farming 
helps them to anticipate and evaluate what they can do in a new region. 
They can be much more ambitious than in their former cocoa farms, and can 
increase the areas cleared and planted. The same process occurred in Ivory 
Coast in the 1970s and 1980s.  
 
 However, from observations in Bungku, we suggest that people 
formerly employed in the service sector and more ‘urban’ activities such 
as cloth traders and drivers also benefit from information and contacts 
given by their jobs with the rural and cocoa sectors. A few people from 
these service sectors are also likely to plant cocoa in the near future. 
This will be a hypothesis to test in the years to come.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Cocoa supply and revenues 
 1997 will be remembered as the year of a disastrous drought 
which caused revenue losses that same year, but was also a driving force 
for searching out new forest land for cocoa planting. 
 1998 will be remembered as a terrible ‘krismon year’ in most 
regions of Java, but as the ‘cocoa year’ in Sulawesi. Throughout 
Sulawesi, 1998 brought a spectacular windfall, which in the short term 
helped tremendously to overcome the effects of the drought in 
established cocoa producing regions. 
 It was an extraordinary ‘cocoa year’, for all actors in the cocoa 
sector, and another factor which accelerated the clearing of forest for 
new plantings.  Thus, through migrations and new clearings and 
plantings, the ‘crisis’ triggered new job opportunities in the cocoa 
sector.  
 This is being achieved without any investment from the state or 
large private companies. The investments are entirely financed by 
smallholders.  1999 and 2000 should confirm these trends in forest 
clearance and new plantings, and thousands of jobs should be created.  
 
Impacts on the other sectors of Sulawesi and other islands  
 
 The most important short term effect lay in the consumption 
capacity. While shops were unable to sell anything in Java, cocoa 
farmers and traders suddenly gained unexpected and huge purchasing 
power. They benefited from that themselves, and in addition, they also 
helped commercial activity to survive in the whole country, by 
providing an outlet for goods in Sulawesi.  
 In terms of jobs, the impact on other sectors is less certain. 
Among new Sulawesi migrants in 1998, most job opportunities seem to 
be taken by people coming from families who came from the rice 
growing regions, and from families already involved in cocoa.  The 
latter have expanded their cocoa plantings, and involved their relatives 
in a new cocoa cycle.  They are  efficient, because they already have all 
the information about cocoa production, the capital to use it, and have 
the experience to get forest land for themselves, and to resell it. They 
create institutional arrangements to accelerate the buying and selling of 
land.  For instance they can afford to look for land in pioneer regions 
and then hire somebody to go the regions of the south and propose that 
land to be sold. They become sort of brokers and promoters between the 
potential supply of, and demand for land. 
 At the end of 1998, migration from cities seem marginal. 
Although we can now find numerous people below the poverty line, we 
have not yet recorded clear cases of migrations to the rural and cocoa 
regions. However, this is to be expected in 1999/2000, and will be 
studied then.  Among migrants from other rural regions of Indonesia, 
there are more hopes. From Bali especially, we expect more 
spontaneous migrants to arrive, as a result of two main processes: calls 
by relatives who are already established in Sulawesi, and the ‘copying 
effect’ inspired by the success stories of other Balinese with cocoa, 
made spectacular by the rocketing price. 
 
Land conflicts and social risk  
 Troubles encountered in some places in Sumatra, such as the 
destruction of assets of estates by angry smallholders whose land had 
been taken over, may be less crucial in Sulawesi as there are relatively 
fewer estates on this island. However there are some cases, and the risk 
is far from being nil. 
 
Policies 
 
As the Indonesian currency collapse has stopped, and is fortunately 
appearing to recover, Sulawesi cocoa farmers may face the paradox of a 
downturn in 1999 and 2000. Especially if the international cocoa price 
keeps falling, there is a unavoidable risk that the local cocoa price will 
plunge, after the spectacular 1998 windfall. This would be a major 
disappointment in Sulawesi. In this case, the main pitfall to avoid would 
be the introduction of a tax on cocoa revenues. This would not be the 
right time to impose it.  
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